Benjamin
Wittes is a Fellow and Research Director in Public Law at The Brookings
Institution and a member of the Hoover Institution Task Force on
National Security and Law.
America
has grown complacent, and how could it have done otherwise? For
years, we have not felt the war our government insists remains a
reality. We keenly feel two related wars, the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the war on terror
has certainly persisted as a legal reality, and in some sense also as
a civic reality. But it has long since ceased to be a practical and
emotional reality. We don't fear getting on airplanes. We don't turn on the news
expecting the worst. We talk about catastrophic acts of terrorism, once an
immediate fear, with a remoteness that bespeaks peacetime, with sentences
starting with "if."
Every success we have had against Al Qaeda--some of them
significant--has augmented our disbelief in the problem. These successes aren't
highly visible battles our forces win, where their victory dramatically
reinforces our sense of the enemy's presence. They are small incidents
whose consequence is that big incidents don't happen. They sometimes take place
altogether invisibly. Or they seem inevitable, because once captured, the
Richard Reids and Jose Padillas seem more pathetic than terrifying and we can't
quite imagine them as the Mohammed Attas they aspired to be. We can
wonder if the Bush administration inflated the threat. And we
can reassure ourselves that law enforcement really offers
adequate tools to manage the problem, if the problem is as serious as
all that anyway.
As law professor Peter Spiro put it in a thoughtful
critique of my recent book on
law and counterterrorism, "Leave aside the now familiar factoid that more
Americans drown in their own bathtubs than are killed by terrorists. Aside from
a single, spectacularly successful attack on downtown Manhattan, terrorists haven't been very
effective of late, or at least no more effective than they had been
pre-9/11." Although I disagree with him--terrorism still is a really big deal--I nonetheless find
myself imagining an attack on the Golden Gate bridge, or on my local Starbucks,
a lot less now than I did a few years back.
But here's the rub: Eventually, we will face another
major attack, because killing large numbers of people is just so much
easier than stopping all efforts to kill large numbers of people. And if we
know this logically, even as we deny it emotionally, we have no choice but to
continue the war on terror in some form, even if we have come to suspend our
fervor for it.
The concept of war is not the construct that
will govern--psychologically, politically, and legally--our continuing response
to Al Qaeda. We need a new one that somehow describes a long-term, low-level
conflict that takes place worldwide and partakes simultaneously of aspects of
warfare, law enforcement, covert action, and diplomacy--a construct that does
not depend on our ongoing, day-to-day sense of menace. Because as hard as
it is to remember the reality of the enemy after seven years, it will grow only
harder still until the day it all comes rushing back, and we chastise ourselves
anew for complacency and failing to heed the warnings that today seem so far-fetched.
--Benjamin Wittes