The Senate intelligence committee released its two-part report this month
exploring pre-war intelligence on Iraq and its use by the Bush
administration. We asked James Martin, a Paul Mellon fellow at Cambridge University who writes on international
security issues, to wade through the 172-page report for us. He'll be
guest-posting his findings here over the next few days.
Released only three days after the publication earlier this month of Scott
McClellan's damning indictment of the Bush administration, What Happened,
new reports by the
Senate Intelligence Committee on prewar Iraq intelligence seem to confirm the
conclusions of the former press-secretary's mea culpa: that the administration
misused and misrepresented the findings of the intelligence community in the
run-up to the war.
The findings of the first report, aptly named "Whether Public
Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by
Intelligence Information," strikes one now as rather anti-climatic--its
conclusions having long since become common knowledge: "In the push to
rally public support for the invasion of Iraq," writes committee chairman
Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), "Administration officials often failed to
accurately portray what was known, what was not known, and what was suspected
about Iraq and the threat it represented to our national security."
But while its conclusions are perhaps not breaking-news, the committee's
report is arguably the clearest and most direct presentation to date of the
disconnect between what was known by the intelligence community in the run-up
to the war and what was claimed to be true by the administration. On the
question of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability, for example, the report analyzes
in detail the White House's willful disregard of the conclusions of the
Department of Energy and the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research that the aluminum
tubes claimed by the CIA to be part of Iraq's supposed uranium enrichment
apparatus were in fact being used for the purposes of a conventional rocket
program--a point that was confirmed by the postwar findings of the Iraq Survey
Group. And when confronted with CIA and DIA assessments that a purported
meeting between Mohammad Atta and Iraqi intelligence officials in 2001 could
not be confirmed, the administration continued to insist that such a meeting
had taken place and that it proved high-level cooperation between Iraq and
al-Qaida.
On the other hand, the report describes numerous instances of agreement
between the intelligence community and the White House on the status of Iraq's
WMD program and Saddam's ties to terrorism. On the question of Iraq's
biological weapons programs, for instance, the report argues that the
administration's public declarations were "substantiated" by
available intelligence information. And, the report claims, the White House was
on sure-footing in arguing for official Iraqi tolerance of the presence of Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi and other al-Qaida-related terrorists within Iraq prior to
the invasion.
The impassioned minority views of some of the committee's dissenting
Republican members--Senators Kit Bond, Saxby Chambliss, Orrin Hatch, and
Richard Burr--focus on these areas of agreement, and argue that charges of
dissimulation on the part of the administration are weakened by the fact
that prominent Democratic members of Congress relied upon the same
intelligence information in drumming up support for the war. If the White House
was lying, they claim, then what were Kerry, Edwards, and Clinton doing?
But as Dan Froomkin at the WashPost points
out, the fact that Congress "bought the administration line" does
not necessarily mean that the two were operating on a level playing field:
"It takes a lot of chutzpah to defend yourself against charges that you've
engaged in a propaganda campaign," he writes, "by noting that it
worked."
It's likely that the administration had access to more intelligence on Iraq than
Congress, as Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) has recently argued,
although the extent of its knowledge remains unclear. Unfortunately, the Senate
committee report takes into account only a handful of official intelligence
estimates and excludes from consideration "less
formal communications" between the White House and the intelligence
community that undoubtedly contained even more details on the status (or non-status)
of Iraq's WMD programs. A more comprehensive investigation into these other
intelligence channels would help clarify what information exactly was available
to the White House and what to Congress, and the extent to which we can
rightfully accuse the former of having lied to the public about the
reasons for going to war.
--James Martin